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ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
Michael F. Urbanski*
James R. Creekmore**
I. INTRODUCTION
The antitrust laws are a minefield for the uninitiated. Indica-
tive of this reality is the fact that there were no successful civil
lawsuits alleging a violation of the antitrust laws brought in
Virginia over the past year. A number of conspiracy, monopoli-
zation and price discrimination cases were attempted, but they
all failed for a variety of reasons outlined in greater detail
below. In contrast to the national trend, no antitrust cases with
regard to health care were decided in Virginia during the past
year. The absence of such cases represents a dramatic change
from previous experience, which perhaps reflects the reality
that- staff privilege and exclusive dealing cases involving hospi-
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tals or physicians are rarely successful under the antitrust
laws.
Although civil antitrust plaintiffs generally were unsuccessful,
federal prosecutors were successful. In one noteworthy case, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the convictions of real estate speculators for bid rigging at fore-
closure auctions. This article addresses antitrust decisions of
the United States Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, and the state and federal courts of Virginia dur-
ing the last year.
II. SUPREME COURT LIFrs BAN ON VERTICAL
MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING
In a much anticipated and heralded decision, the United
States Supreme Court, in State Oil Co. v. Khan,' lifted the per
se ban on vertical maximum price fixing established nearly
three decades earlier in Albrecht v. Herald Co.2 The Court de-
clared that vertical maximum price fixing no longer should be
subject to this per se rule, which would continue to apply to
vertical minimum price fixing arrangements.' Rather, vertical
maximum price fixing should be subject to a "rule of reason"
analysis.4 The Court's ruling in Khan, therefore, gives manufac-
turers more freedom to dictate to their retailers the price ceil-
ings for the resale of their products.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
observed that there was no evidence to suggest that vertical
maximum price fixing arrangements harmed consumers and re-
versed the decades old ruling in Albrecht, in which the Court
branded maximum retail price fixing unlawful per se.5 In
Albrecht, a newspaper publisher granted exclusive territories to
1. 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997) (overruling Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968)).
2. 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968).
3. See hoan, 118 S. Ct. at 279. The Court first announced the per se rule as
applicable to minimum vertical price fixing arrangements in Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), in which the Court recognized the
illegality of agreements that allow manufacturers or suppliers to establish minimum
resale prices to be charged by their distributors. See id. at 408.
4. See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 279.
5. See id. at 278.
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independent carriers on the condition that they adhere to a
maximum price for resale of newspapers to the public. The
Court expressed concern that vertical maximum price fixing
would allow suppliers to discriminate against certain dealers,
restrict the services that dealers could afford to offer customers,
or disguise minimum price fixing schemes.6 The Court rejected
the notion that, because the newspaper's publisher "granted
exclusive territories, a price ceiling was necessary to protect the
public from price gouging by dealers who had monopoly power
in their own territories.'
Subsequent to Albrecht, the Court made two decisions that
provoked a demonstrable shift in the focus of antitrust analysis
of vertical restraints from protecting intrabrand competition .to
protecting interbrand competition. In 1977, the Court overruled
United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co.,' also of the Albrecht
era, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,9 denounc-
ing application of the per se rule in the context of vertical
nonprice restraints."0 Then in 1990, the Court, in Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., again recognized that
maximum price fixing may have pro-competitive interbrand
effects and subtly noted its concern over the continuing validity
of the rule in Albrecht without expressly denouncing it. 2 In
1997, however, Khan presented the Court with the direct oppor-
tunity to sanction this new focus and, finally, to abandon the
antitrust law established in Albrecht. 3
At issue in Khan was the legality of an agreement to lease
and operate a gas station and convenience store, which set the
maximum price at which the dealer, Barkat U. Khan, could
resell gasoline. The agreement provided that Khan would obtain
6. See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153.
7. Id. In deciding Albrecht, the Court was guided by the principle established in
Kiefer Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), that
agreements to fix maximum prices, "no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple
the freedom of traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with
their own judgment.L " Id. at 213.
8. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
9. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
10. See id. at 58.
11. 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
12. See id. at 335 n.5.
13. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 285 (1997).
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the station's gasoline supply from State Oil at a price equal to
a suggested retail price set by State Oil, less a margin of three
and one quarter cents per gallon. Under the agreement, Khan
could charge any amount for gasoline sold to the station's cus-
tomers, but if the price charged was higher than State Oil's
suggested retail price, the excess was to be rebated to State
Oil. Khan could sell gasoline for less than State Oil's suggested
retail price, but any such decrease would reduce his three and
one quarter cents per gallon margin. 4
When Khan fell behind in making lease payments, State Oil
terminated the lease and evicted him. A receiver was appointed
to operate the station. The receiver, who was free of the pricing
restriction imposed by State Oil, produced a profit by lowering
the price of regular fuel and increasing the price of premium
fuel over and above the price ceiling. Khan then brought suit,
alleging that the maximum resale price restriction violated the
antitrust laws."5
Refusing to follow Albrecht,6 the Court restated its general
view that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to pro-
tect competition between competing brands of products, thereby
benefitting consumers.' "Our interpretation of the Sherman
Act also incorporates the notion that condemnation of practices
resulting in lower prices to consumers is 'especially costly' be-
cause 'cutting prices in order to increase business often is the
very essence of competition."" The Court reasoned that maxi-
mum resale prices could not harm either consumers or competi-
tion because, if a supplier squeezes his dealers' margins below
a competitive level, the attempt to do so would drive the deal-
ers to a competing supplier." Moreover, given the re-emer-
14. See id. at 278 (1997).
15. See id.
16. The Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit's criticism that Albrecht suffered
from "infirmities, [and] its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations." Id. at 284.
Nonetheless, the Court was reticent to tread lightly on the doctrine of stare decisis,
by which the Seventh Circuit had felt bound in upholding Albrecht in its decision.
The Court noted that the doctrine was less compelling in the field of antitrust law,
where considerations of changing business experience mandated an evolution of the
law to keep up with contemporary economic principles. See id-
17. See id. at 282.
18. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
594 (1986)).
19. See id.
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gence of exclusive territories in the wake of GTE Sylvania, the
Court recognized the potential for dealer monopolies within
such territories under the per se rule of Albrecht. °
The Court also took issue with the potential injuries to com-
petition asserted in Albrecht in defense of the per se rule. The
Court noted that the prohibition on maximum prices directly
resulted in many suppliers themselves becoming distributors,
thereby denigrating the independence of the those dealers that
the rule sought to protect.21 Moreover, the Court noted that a
supplier's practice of intentionally establishing unnecessarily
low maximum prices may actually harm consumers and other
suppliers.' In addition, the dealers will be harmed due to
their inability to offer their products to consumers at such
prices.' Therefore, the Court concluded that there was "in-
sufficient economic justification for per se invalidation of verti-
cal maximum price fixing.'
Although the Supreme Court did not declare maximum price
fixing lawful, its abandonment of the per se rule will provide
suppliers with greater flexibility in establishing and enforcing
maximum resale prices. Under the flexible "rule of reason"
approach, if it can be shown that a price ceiling is established
for legitimate business purposes and is necessary to compete
against other supplier's brands, such a ceiling should survive
antitrust scrutiny. Procompetitive justifications will continue to
be weighed against likely anticompetitive effects in such analy-
sis.
III. CiviL ANTITRUST ACTIONS
Antitrust plaintiffs in the Fourth Circuit and Virginia courts
fared little better than Khan, with the majority of claimants'
cases being dismissed on fundamental principles of pleading
requirements or standard defenses. The few cases that were
considered, as discussed below, illustrate the continued reluc-
20. See iUL at 283.
21. See id.
22. See id at 282-83.
23. See id
24. Id. at 283.
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tance of the courts to stifle competition on little more than the
pleas of unsuccessful market players.
A. Immunity Issues
1. Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine
In Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs,' the Fourth Circuit had the occa-
sion to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to a
claimed antitrust conspiracy among related entities. Building on
its decisions in Okasanen v. Page Memorial Hospital" and Ad-
vanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hospi-
tal,2" the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a Sherman
Act conspiracy case brought against an individual and several
businesses controlled by him."
At issue in Zachair was a parcel of land in Maryland used
both as a commercial airport and a gravel and sand mine. De-
fendant Washington Executive Airpark Limited ("WEALP")
purchased the parcel in 1988 and began a mining operation
thereon. WEALP's general partner, Washington Executive
Airpark, Inc. ("Airpark"), operated an aviation facility on the
same parcel. When WEALP ran into difficulty, defaulting on
several loans and filing for bankruptcy, plaintiff Zachair, Ltd.
("Zachair") bought the parcel at foreclosure. Zachair could make
little use of the parcel, though, and claimed that the defendants
used various means to frustrate its purchase, including chal-
lenging the sale's validity, refusing to remit rental payments
and mining royalties, refusing to vacate the property, depleting
mineral resources on the property, and preventing Zachair from
obtaining a mining permit.29
The district court rejected Zachair's claim that the conduct by
the various defendants stated a Sherman Act claim." The
court focused on plaintiffs allegation that defendant John
25. No. 97-1811, 1998 WL 211943, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 1998) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision).
26. 945 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1991).
27. 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
28. See Zachair, 1998 WL 211943, at *3.
29. See id.
30. See Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741, 749 (D. Md. 1997).
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Driggs controlled the defendant corporations as a barrier to
establishing a conspiracy."' Reviewing the Rule 12(b)(6) 2 dis-
missal de novo, the Fourth Circuit had little difficulty affirming
the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that the Supreme Court, in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp.,' specifically declined to decide whether a parent
corporation may conspire with an affiliated company that it
does not wholly own.' The court, however, used the factors
articulated in Copperweld to find the entities controlled by
defendant John Driggs "incapable of conspiring in restraint of
trade."" Examining the allegations in the complaint, the court
found that "Zachair failed to allege concerted action by separate
legal .entities within the meaning of the Sherman Act." 6
Unlike earlier cases decided on the basis of intracorporate
immunity, in Zachair, the Fourth Circuit was willing to apply
the immunity doctrine, notwithstanding the fact that the pre-
cise business relationships among the various corporate defen-
dants were not established clearly. Building upon the principles
established in Copperweld, Oksanen, and Advanced Health Care
Services, the court upheld the dismissal of the action merely
because the plain language of the complaint alleged that the
corporate defendants all were controlled by John Driggs, which
rendered these entities incapable of conspiring to violate the
antitrust laws."7 The Fourth Circuit's willingness to apply the
intracorporate immunity doctrine, despite the fact that the
specific corporate relationship was not articulated clearly, rep-
.resents a logical expansion of that doctrine in this circuit.
.2. Local Government Antitrust Act ("LGAA") and State Action
Immunity
In Command Force Security, Inc. v. City of Portsmouth,' a
private security firm filed an antitrust action against the City
31. See i&L
32. FED. R. Cirv. P. 12(bX6).
33. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
34. See id at 766-77.
35. Zachair, 1998 WL 211943, at *3.
36. Id at *2.
37. See id.
38. 968 F. Supp. 1069 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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of Portsmouth, its sheriff and chief of police, alleging an anti-
trust conspiracy to set prices and monopolize the market for
unlicensed, off-duty security workers in violation of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act 9 and the Virginia Antitrust Act.'
The violation, alleged by plaintiff Command Force Security, Inc.
("Command Force"), consisted of Portsmouth deputy sheriffs and
police officers moonlighting as private security guards while
utilizing municipal-owned uniforms, weapons and equipment.41
Command Force also maintained that defendants encouraged
on-duty personnel to solicit private security positions for off-
duty personnel." Defendants moved to dismiss the claims on
the ground that they were absolutely immune from suit pursu-
ant to the Local Government Antitrust Act ("LGAA"),' the
state action doctrine, and the applicable state-law provisions
that mirror these federal bars.4
The court found that both the City of Portsmouth and its
police chief were immune from paying monetary damages pur-
suant to the LGAA because the city is covered as a "local gov-
ernment" and the police chief was acting within his official
capacity. 4 The court stated "[s]imply put, then, insofar as the
complaint attacks the City of Portsmouth on federal antitrust
grounds, the plaintiff simply cannot obtain money damages."46
Following the decision in Sandcrest Outpatient Services v.
Cumberland County Hospital,47 the court declined to require a
showing of an affirmative grant of explicit authority for an em-
ployee or governmental official to act in an official capacity
under the LGAA.48 Also, the court noted that Congress intend-
ed the "official capacity" proviso in the LGAA to shield local
government officials from liability to the same extent as the
local government itself.49 Although the LGAA provides immu-
nity from money damages, it does not bar claims for injunctive
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1994).
40. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
41. See Command Force Sec., 968 F. Supp. at 1071.
42. See id.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 34 (1994).
44. See Command Force Sec., 968 F. Supp. at 1071.
45. See id. at 1072.
46. Id.
47. 853 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1988).
48. See Command Force Sec., 968 F. Supp. at 1072.
49. See id.
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relief.5" At the same time, the court held that the Portsmouth
sheriff was not immune under the LGAA because he did not
qualify as a "local government official," as he was a state con-
stitutional officer.5
The remaining issues were dispelled by application of the
state action doctrine, which provided immunity from injunctive
relief and immunity *for the Portsmouth sheriff.52 First articu-
lated in Parker v. Brown,' the state action doctrine provides
that the federal afititrust laws are not intended to prohibit
states from imposing restraints on competition; thus, a state is
immune from antitrust actions seeking either monetary or in-
junctive relief." To the extent that state officials are acting in
their official capacity, they also benefit from state action immu-
nity.55 In Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,56 the Supreme
Court recognized that in order to receive state action immunity,
localities "must demonstrate that their anticompetitive activities
were authorized by the State 'pursuant to state policy to dis-
place competition with regulation."'57 Citing Town of Hallie,
the district court in Command Force Security held that "[s]tate
policy need not expressly set forth that it intends the delegated
action to have anticompetitive effects; instead, the test is met
when the anticompetitive effects are a 'foreseeable result' of the
grant of authority to regulate."58
Reviewing the statutory scheme which allows localities to
adopt ordinances permitting deputy sheriffs and police officers
to engage in off-duty employment,59 the court held that it was
clearly foreseeable that these statutes would cause moonlighting
police officers and deputy sheriffs to compete with private secu-
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1072-74.
53. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
54. See Command Force Sec., 968 F. Supp. at 1072.
55. See id. at 1072-73.
56. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
57. Id. at 39 (quoting Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389,
413 (1978)).
58. Command Force Sec., 968 F. Supp. at 1073 (citing Town of Hallie, 471 U.S.
at 41-44).
59. See VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-1712 (Cum. Supp. 1998); id. § 9-183.2 (Repl. Vol.
1998).
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rity companies.' Thus, pursuant to Town of Hallie, the state
action doctrine immunized the city and its police chief. The
court applied state action immunity, notwithstanding the fact
that Portsmouth had not enacted an ordinance permitting its
deputy sheriffs and police officers to engage in off-duty employ-
ment.61 Following the decisions in City of Columbia v. Omni
Outdoor Advertising,2 Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City and
County of Denver," and Boone v. Redevelopment Agency of San
Jose," the court held that principles of federalism prevent a
plaintiff from circumventing state action immunity by arguing
that the municipality imperfectly exercised its authority under
state law.65
The court also applied the state action doctrine to bar
plaintiffs claims under the Virginia Antitrust Act.66 First, the
court held that "the immunities available to the defend.ints
from liability under state antitrust law exactly mirror the im-
munities available to the defendants from liability under federal
antitrust law." 7 Second, the court noted that, to the extent the
challenged conduct was "authorized, regulated or approved ...
by a statute of this Commonwealth," it was exempt."
B. Sufficiency of Section 1 Conspiracy Allegations
As with past precedent, the Fourth Circuit continued to dis-
play intolerance for insufficiently pleaded and supported con-
spiracy claims. For example, in Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs,"9 the
Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs section 1 claims under the Sherman Act, concluding
that Zachair's complaint failed to "provide sufficient factual
60. See Command Force Sec., 968 F. Supp. at 1073.
61. See id.
62. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
63. 937 F.2d 1502 (10th Cir. 1991). -
64. 841 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1988).
65. See Command Force Sec., 968 F. Supp. at 1073.
66. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-9.1 to -9.18 (Repl. Vol. 1998).
67. Command Force Sec., 968 F. Supp. at 1074 (citing Reasor v. City of Norfolk,
606 F. Supp. 788 (E.D. Va. 1984)).
68. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-9.4(bXl) (Repl. Vol. 1998)).
69. No. 97-1811, 1998 WL 211943, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 30, 1998) (per curiam)
(unpublished table decision); see generally supra Section IIHA.1.
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support" for its conclusory conspiracy claims.7" The plaintiff
had alleged that the corporate defendants conspired with two
independent persons at a foreclosure sale in an effort to subvert
the sale to prevent the plaintiff from entering the mining in-
dustry. The court reasoned that "[n]owhere does the complaint
make allegations of communications, meetings, or any other
means through which one might infer that [the bidders] know-
ingly participated in an alleged scheme to prevent Zachair from
operating a sand and gravel mine."7 The court noted that the
plaintiffs only conspiracy allegation-that some of the defen-
dants merely attended the foreclosure auction-failed to allege
facts sufficient to show a conspiracy.
72
In Carolina Security and Fire, Inc. v. Control Systems Inter-
national, Inc.,73 the Fourth Circuit also briefly addressed and
affirmed a dismissal of a claim under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. The claim was brought by contractors acting as resellers
against a manufacturer of energy controls equipment for heat-
ing and air conditioning units. Control Systems International
("CSI") sold its energy controls both directly and through "au-
thorized" value-added resellers ("VARs") who were trained by
CSI and had ongoing contracts with CSI, which dealt with sales
quotas and non-exclusive territories. 74 The plaintiffs were me-
chanical and security contractors who bid on and received a
government contract for the installation of heating and air
conditioning systems at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The
government contracts required the contractor to be an autho-
rized CSI installer, but the plaintiffs failed to use the autho-
rized CSI subcontractor.75
When the authorized CSI subcontractor learned of the
plaintiffs' procurement of the contracts, it questioned the gov-
ernment about the CSI authorization being used by the contrac-
tor. Ultimately, these inquiries went to CSI, who confirmed that
the contractor being used was not authorized. This resulted in
70. Zachair, 1998 WL 211943, at *2.
71. Id.
72. See i .
73. No. 97-1528, 1998 WL 417285, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 10, 1998) (unpublished
table decision).
74. See id. at *1.
75. See id.
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the plaintiffs' termination from the contracts. The plaintiffs,
therefore, sued CSI for violations of section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the Unfair Trade Practices Act ("UTPA"), and a host of
other contract and tort claims. The district court awarded sum-
mary judgment to CSI on each claim. 6 The court's decision
was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit on the same reasoning.77
In affirming the decision of the district court, the Fourth
Circuit held that a conspiracy will not be inferred when a man-
ufacturer responds to one of its dealers' complaints, as CSI did
for its authorized VAR. 8 Moreover, the dealer's legitimate
complaint and CS's response thereto did not give rise to a rea-
sonable inference of conspiracy.79 Finally, with regard to the
UTPA claim, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court
that the "plaintiffs failed to prove that cSI's allegedly unfair
acts 'adversely impacted the public interest because plaintiffs
did not show that the acts were capable of repetition."'
Similarly, in Grinnell Corp. v. Road Sprinkler Fitters Local
Union No. 669,81 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
a Sherman Act conspiracy claim brought by Grinnell
Corporation ("Grinnell"), a manufacturer of fire sprinkler sys-
tems, against a local and national labor union. Grinnell charged
that the union conspired with the National Fire Sprinkler Asso-
ciation ("NFSA"), a trade association to which Grinnell belonged
and had assigned its collective bargaining rights, to engage in
activity that constituted an illegal restraint of trade under
section 1 of the Sherman Act. More specifically, Grinnell, a
designer, manufacturer, and installer of fire sprinkler systems,
maintained that the defendants conspired with NFSA to with-
draw the availability of a job program from which Grinnell
benefitted as a means of forcing it to reassign its bargaining
rights to NFSA.82 The program in question allowed for a con-
tractor and the local union to negotiate various concessionary
76. See Hatfield v. Control Sys. Int'l, Inc., No. 3:95-1577-23, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 22927, *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 1997).
77. See Carolina Sec. and Fire, 1998 WL 417285, at *3.
78. See id.
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. No. 97-1855, 1998 WL 24958, at *1 (4th Cir. Jan. 21, 1998) (unpublished
table decision).
82. See id. at *1.
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rate agreements for individual projects located in a particular
geographical area as a means of competing with lower-cost,
nonunion contractors." Grinnell also contended that the defen-
dants conspired to prevent it from obtaining a more favorable
collective bargaining agreement.'
In a per curiam affirmation of the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the union, the Fourth Circuit accepted
the district court's finding that the union acted unilaterally in
withdrawing from Grinnell the right to participate on the job
program.85 The court repeated the now famous refrain from
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,"
that "[c]onduct as consistent with permissible competition as
with illegal conspiracy, does not, standing alone, support an
inference of antitrust conspiracy."87 The Fourth Circuit agreed
with the district court's ruling that the plaintiff did not dis-
charge its burden of bringing forward evidence which excludes
the possibility that the alleged co-conspirators acted indepen-
dently or based on a legitimate business purpose."
At the other end of the spectrum, the plaintiffs in Dee-K
Enterprises, Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd.89 were successful in
pleading an actionable antitrust conspiracy. Their complaint
provided more than the bare bones allegation of antitrust con-
spiracy and included references to particular meetings between
distributors and producers, a listing of the acts engaged in by
distributors in furtherance of the conspiracy, and a description
of how the terms of the cartel were enforced. Plaintiffs Dee-K
Enterprises and Asheboro Elastics Corporation, both end-users
of extruded rubber products, filed a class-action complaint
against certain international producers and domestic distribu-
tors of extruded rubber thread, alleging that the defendants en-
gaged in a conspiracy to fix prices and to restrain competition
in the sale of extruded rubber thread throughout the world,
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. at *1-2.
86. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
87. Grinnell, 1998 WL 24958, at *1 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at
574).
88. See id.
89. 177 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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including the United States, in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act." Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendants agreed to raise rubber thread prices worldwide, to re-
strict rivalry for customers, and to discipline employees and
distributors who discounted prices or otherwise violated the
terms of the cartel.9
The court held that the plaintiffs' complaint contained suffi-
cient facts to support allegations of such a conspiracy under
Estate Construction Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co.' Al-
though identifying no specific times or dates and only one spe-
cific communication to substantiate their allegations,, the plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendant-distributors did the following:
(1) coordinated a series of significant price increases in the
United States; (2) reported to the producers any prices of other
distributors that were below the level set by the conspirators;
and (3) refused requests from their customers for. discounts
when they were instructed to do so by the producers.9"
Noting the extensive cost and burden of antitrust discovery,
the court took issue with the contention that Estate Construc-
tion represented a departure from traditional notice pleading
requirements, reasoning as follows:
Federal discovery, which extends beyond the boundaries of
the relevant to include that which might lead to the rele-
vant, can often be extensive, expensive and burdensome.
Before this is inflicted on defendants, it is reasonable to in-
sist that the claim asserted be based on more than a
plaintiff's hope or suspicion. In other words, discovery is the
cart, not the horse, and skeletal allegations of antitrust
conspiracy based on no more than hope or suspicion wrong-
ly put the cart before the horse.'
Also, the court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that, a com-
plaint need not contain specific allegations regarding each and
every defendant. The court noted that in In re Mid-Atlantic
90. See Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1142 (E.D.
Va. 1997).
91. See id. at 1142.
92. 14 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 1994).
93. See Dee-K Enters., 982 F. Supp. at 1150-51.
94. Id. at 1150 n.25.
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ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
Toyota Antitrust Litigation,95 the pleadings contained specific
allegations of the persons in attendance at meetings, the topics
discussed, and the impact those discussions had on the alleged
conspiracy to restrain price competition. 9' In that regard, the
court found Mid-Atlantic Toyota to be consistent with the re-
quirements of Estate Construction.97
The plaintiffs' complaint in Dee-K Enterprises was held suffi-
cient despite the fact that it did not contain any specific times
or dates or any specific communications to substantiate the
conspiracy allegations.9 The court noted that Estate Construc-
tion requires only such details "whenever possible" and held
that the failure to list such details would not defeat a plaintiffs
claim where the complaint otherwise contains allegations of
communications, meetings, or other means through which one
might infer the existence of a conspiracy. 99
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the
plaintiffs' section 1 claims in Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. W.R.
Grace & Co.-Conn.,'° in a case in which the plaintiffs alleged
that, by removing over eighty percent of the vermiculite mining
reserves in Louisa County from the mining market through
non-mining agreements, the defendants conspired to constrain
plaintiff Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd.'s ("VVL") operations and,
ultimately, its ability to compete with defendants W.R. Grace &
Co.-Connecticut ("Grace"), the only other domestic producer of
vermiculite. Contrary to the findings of Judge Michael in the
Western District, the Fourth Circuit found an adequate basis
for a colorable section 1 claim in the business transaction be-
tween the defendants, by which Grace donated to Historic
Green Springs, Incorporated ("HGSI"), a nonprofit land conser-
vation organization, 1400 acres of land comprising over forty
percent of the known vermiculite deposits in the United States
95. 525 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Md. 1981).
96. See Dee-K Enters., 982 F. Supp. at 1150 n.27.
97. See id. at 1150.
98. See id.
99. Id. (quoting Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller & Smith Holding Co., 14 F.3d 213,
221 (4th Cir. 1994)).
100. 156 F.3d 535 (4th Cir. 1998). For extensive consideration of the lower court's
opinion, see Michael F. Urbanski, et al., Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 31 U.
RiciL L. REv. 943, 953-56, 965-67 (1997).
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pursuant to a non-mining agreement. 1' The court noted that
not only might the land have been mined by HGSI were the
non-mining agreement not entered, but also "[a]bsent its trans-
action with HGSI, Grace may even have been required to grant
VVL access to its Virginia holdings, on the ground that failure
to do so would constitute an improper, unilateral refusal to
deal." 2 Thus, the court found that the plaintiffs had satisfied
their burden of making only a "'colorable' showing that it was
'reasonably proble' that the behavior in question caused their
injury. " 103
The Fourth Circuit also reinstated the plaintiffs' section 1
claims against HGSI, which Judge Michael had dismissed on
the ground that HGSI, as a nonprofit organization pursuing
non-commercial objectives, was exempt from the antitrust
laws.' O° The Fourth Circuit rejected the rationale by which
other circuits have found nonprofit organizations exempt, rely-
ing instead on both the clear and unambiguous application of
section 1 to "'[e]very person' who acts in restraint of trade or
commerce" and the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize a per
se exemption for nonprofit organizations. °5 Lest there by any
question, however, of the existence of such an exemption, the
Fourth Circuit explicitly delineated two bases by which HGSI
was removed from the protective umbrella of any such exemp-
tion: (i) that the transaction in which it participated with Grace
was "essentially commercial"; and (ii) that HGSI conspired with
a nonexempt party that had knowledge of the anticompetitive
effects to be derived from such conduct.'
C. Antitrust Standing
1. Indirect Purchaser
The court in Dee-K Enterprises, Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd. °7
101. See Virginia Vermiculite, 156 F.3d at 538.
102. Id. at 539.
103. Id.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 540.
106. See id.
107. 982 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Va. 1997).
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also considered the plaintiffs' standing as indirect purchasers of
imported extruded rubber products. The defendants contended
that because the plaintiffs did not purchase directly from the
alleged producer-conspirators, they were not "injured in [their]
business or property" as required by section 4 of the Clayton
Act.10
8
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court deter-
mined that one who does not buy directly from the antitrust
violator but, instead, is at least one step removed in the distri-
bution chain, cannot maintain a private antitrust action."'
The court in Dee-K Enterprises held that the rule in Illinois
Brick did not bar the plaintiffs from suing the defendants for
the price-fixing conspiracy alleged."' The court held that the
plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that the distributors themselves
were part of the conspiracy and that the plaintiffs' claims also
might survive under the "ownership-control" exception to Illi-
nois Brick" because the plaintiffs had alleged facts indicating
ownership or controlled relationships between several of the
international distributors and domestic producers."'
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the
existence of the ownership-control exception, Judge Ellis of the
Eastern District of Virginia opined that it has "gained a strong
foothold in federal antitrust jurisprudence.""' Acknowledging
' hat the exception exists and is applicable when the direct
purchaser is owned or controlled by the manufacturer, the court
found that the plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged facts indi-
cating control relationships that were sufficient to avoid the
limitations of Illinois Brick and to overcome the motion to dis-
miss.
n5
108. See id. at 1151.
109. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
110. See id at 735.
111. See Dee-K Enters., 982 F. Supp. at 1151-52.
112. See 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. Also, the district court noted in its decision that
"counsel for defendants conceded at oral argument that there is an ownership-control
exception to the indirect-purchaser rule." Dee-K Enters. Co., 982 F. Supp. at 1153.
113. See Dee-K Enters. Co., 982 F. Supp. at 1152-53.
114. Id. at 1153.
115. See id. at 1155.
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The district court also grappled with the issue of whether the
action could proceed even though the plaintiffs had failed to
name all distributors involved in the conspiracy as defen-
dants."' The court held that when a plaintiff, who is an indi-
rect purchaser, alleges that the direct purchasers were part of a
conspiracy, the Illinois Brick rule, seeking to avoid multiple
liability, does not apply."" The court provided two reasons for
employing this rationale. The first was that the "plaintiff has in
a sense converted itself into a direct purchaser-in this event
from the producer-distributor unit.""' The second reason was
that "there is no danger of double-liability on the producers'
part because the antitrust laws prohibit one co-conspirator from
suing another.""' Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiffs failed
to name all of the distributors involved in the conspiracy as
defendants in the action does not preclude the plaintiffs from
sustaining the action.
Finally, in support of the defendants' assertion that the
plaintiffs had not suffered any antitrust injury, the defendants
argued that the Department of Commerce determined that the
defendants' domestic prices for extruded rubber were below fair
value; therefore, their prices must be below the competitive
price. The court held, however, that "below fair value" did not
mean "below competitive prices in the U.S. market."" ° Hence,
the court denied the defendants' various motions to dismiss the
plaintiffs' second amended complaint.' In a subsequent opin-
ion issued on January 22, 19 9 8 ," the court dismissed one de-
fendant from the aforementioned action pursuant to Federal
Rule 41 but refused to grant payment for its attorney's fees,
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2)."
116. See id. at 1153.
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1153-54 (citing Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091,
1107 (1st Cir. 1994)). The court in Sullivan established that "a plaintiffs complete,
voluntary, and substantially equal participation in an illegal practice under the anti-
trust laws precludes recovery for that antitrust violation." Id.
120. Id. at 1156.
121. See id. at 1157.
122. See Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 177 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Va. 1998).
123. See id. at 356.
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2. Injury in Fact ,
Most recently, the Fourth Circuit, in a per curiam opinion
affirming the grant of summary judgment in a class action case
alleging milk price fixing, provided an extensive discussion of
antitrust standing and the injury in fact requirement under
section 4 of the Clayton Act." In a case whose tortured histo-
ry dates back to the middle 1980s, the Fourth Circuit ruled
that two small grocery stores, who were the named plaintiffs in
two consolidated class action suits, failed to produce sufficient
evidence of injury in fact and, therefore, lacked antitrust stand-
ing.' The case arose out of a school milk bid-rigging investi-
gation- conducted by the government and was founded upon bits
of ambiguous testimony from an earlier criminal trial,, which
had ended in a hung jury. After failing in their effort to have
the case dismissed on the ground that the statute of limitations
had run,' the dairies took the deposition of a former dairy
employee, whose earlier testimony formed the basis of the gro-
cery stores' case.
In the deposition, however, the former dairy employee testi-
fied that his discussions with his competitors had very narrow
application and specifically had "no application" to the named
plaintiffs.' The Fourth Circuit noted that this testimony was
significant because "it reveals the narrow scope of his price-fix-
ing discussions and the fact that the alleged conspiracy did not
have the all-encompassing effects which the grocery stores
urge."'
The Fourth Circuit also noted that pricing data from the
dairies did not support the claimed conspiracy that the dairies
had agreed upon joint responses to the change in the regulated
cost of raw milk." Quoting Matsushita Electrical Industrial
124. See Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Valley Rich Dairy, Nos. 97-2314 & 97-
2315, 1998 WL 610648, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 1998). The author was counsel of
record for Valley Rich Dairy.
125. See id. at *26-27.
126. See Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., 874 F.
Supp. 721 (W.D. Va. 1994), rev'd, 71 F.3d 119 (4th Cir. 1995).
127. Supermarket of Marlinton, 1998 WL 610648, at *5.
128. Id. at *26.
129. Id. at *25.
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Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.130 for the proposition that "antitrust
law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous
evidence in a § 1 case," 3' the court rejected the speculative
inference of injury claimed by the grocery stores.' 2
The Fourth Circuit ruled that an antitrust standing analysis
should begin by examining the plaintiffs alleged injury, which
the court termed "potentially dispositive."' The court noted
that "injury is the 'crux' of every private antitrust action."'
The court reasoned that "[tihis threshold showing of injury,
sometimes labeled injury in fact, is satisfied if the plaintiff can
produce sufficient evidence of an injury 'proximately caused by
the defendants' conduct. "
135
The court concluded that the grocery stores "failed to produce
sufficient evidence that the products they purchased were af-.,
fected by the alleged price-fixing conspiracy. As such, they have
failed to satisfy the threshold requirement of demonstrating
injury in fact, and therefore, lacked antitrust standing."'36
D. Price Discrimination
The District Court for the Western District of Virginia recent-
ly grappled with a significant Robinson-Patman Act case, dis-
missing the plaintiffs case on summary judgment in Hoover
Color Corp. v. Bayer Corp.' Hoover Color Corporation ("Hoo-
ver"), a manufacturer and distributor of natural and synthetic
iron oxides, brought suit against Bayer Corporation ("Bayer")
alleging that Bayer engaged in price discrimination under the
Robinson-Patman Act by selling the Bayferrox brand of synthet-
ic iron oxide pigments to other distributors at prices lower than
130. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
131. Id. at 588.
132. See Supermarket of Marlinton, 1998 WL 610648, at *26.
133. Id.
134. Id. at *10 (citing Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 66 (4th
Cir. 1977)).
135. Id. (quoting Doctor's Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Southeast Med. Alliance, Inc.,
123 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 1997)).
136. Id. at *6.
137. No. 96-0841-R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15452, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 30, 1998)
(granting summary judgment).
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the price at which Bayer sold the products to Hoover." In
particular, Hoover challenged Bayer's administration of its vol-
ume discount system under which Hoover contended that it was
disfavored.' Although Hoover did not claim that it was im-
permissible for Bayer to offer a volume discount schedule, it
nonetheless asserted that Bayer failed to provide "uniform pric-
es" to its distributors because Bayer based its volume discount
at the outset of a year upon the prior year's aggregate purchas-
es. 14
Although the suit was brought in 1996, the first count of
Hoover's complaint alleged price discrimination violations dur-
ing the 1982-1992 period. Consequently, Bayer moved to dis-
miss Hoover's pre-1992 claims, asserting that it was barred by
the Clayton Act's four-year statute of limitations.'4'
Judge Jackson L. Kiser, relying on Pocahontas Supreme Coal
Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., held that Hoover could not as-
sert a claim for damages beyond the four-year statute of limi-
tations.' In Pocahontas Supreme Coal, the Fourth Circuit
held that "[aiccrual of a private antitrust cause of action for the
purposes of the statute of limitations occurs when defendants
commit an act that causes economic harm to a plaintiff."'
Judge Kiser reasoned that in a price discrimination action, the
plaintiffs cause of action accrues from the date of each discrim-
inatory sale, and it is at that time that the plaintiff is in-
jured.'45 Thus, any claim for damages based on sales outside
of the four-year statute of limitations was time-barred.
Hoover argued that further discovery was necessary to deter-
mine whether "sales prior to September 1992, had a residual
adverse economic impact that came to fruition at a later
138. See id at *3.
139. See id
140. See id
141. See Hoover Color Corp. v. Bayer Corp., No. 96-841-R, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12676, at *4 (W.D. Va. July 24, 1997) (granting motion to dismiss). The author was
counsel of record for Bayer Corporation.
142. 828 F.2d 211 (4th Cir. 1987).
143. See Hoover Color, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12676, at *4-5.
144. See Pocahontas Supreme Coal, 828 F.2d at 217-18 (citing Zenith Radio Corp.
v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 338 (1971)).
145. See Hoover Color, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12676, at *5.
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date." ' The court was quick to dismiss this alternative theory,
stating that "[t]here are no other acts alleged that could give
rise to the cause of action, and no explanation, not even a hy-
pothetical one, has been given for how further discovery may
reveal economic harms within the statutory period emanating
from pre-1992 discriminatory sales."47 After substantial dis-
covery, Bayer moved for summary judgment, which the district
court granted on the basis of the statutory affirmative defense
of meeting competition."
Price discrimination violations are difficult to prove, and for
that reason, they are seldom successful. The court noted that
the plaintiff must prove the following elements to establish the
existence of a price discrimination violation under section 2(a)
of the Robinson-Patman Act:
First, the seller must be "engaged in commerce," the price
discrimination must occur "in the course of such commerce,"
and at least one of the sales constituting the discrimination
must occur "in commerce." Second, the discrimination must
involve contemporaneous "sales" to two or more purchasers
at different prices. Third, the items sold must be "commod-
ities of like grade and quality." Fourth, there must be a
reasonable possibility that the discriminatory prices will
substantially lessen competition, or injure, destroy, or pre-
vent competition.149
With regard to damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, for
a plaintiff to recover on a claim of price discrimination, there
also must be a demonstration that actual injury to its business
or property was sustained because of the discrimination."
In response to Hoover's claim, Bayer not only challenged
Hoover's ability to prove two of these required elements, it also
raised two affirmative defenses to the price discrimination
claim. In rendering his decision, Judge Kiser assumed, without
deciding, that Hoover had introduced sufficient evidence to
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See Hoover Color Corp. v. Bayer Corp., No. CIV.A96-0841-R, 1998 WL 690991
at *3 (W.D. Va. July 30, 1998) (mem.) (granting summary judgment).
149. Id. *2 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994)).
150. See id.
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establish a prima facie case and focused upon the validity of
the affirmative defense of meeting competition that was assert-
ed by Bayer.'
Under the meeting competition defense set forth in section
2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, a seller may provide lower
prices to certain market competitors as long as the prices are
set "in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competi-
tor."'52  Following the Supreme Court's opinion in United
States v. Gypsum," the court in Hoover Color articulated the
following non-exhaustive list "of factors that could be relevant
to determining a seller's good faith:
(1) whether the seller had received reports of similar dis-
counts from other customers, (2) whether the seller was
threatened with a termination of purchases if the discounts
were not met, (3) whether the seller made efforts to cor-
roborate the reported discount by seeking documentary
evidence or by appraising its reasonableness in terms of
available market data, and (4) whether the seller had past
experience with the buyer.'
Judge Kiser applied the Gypsum factors and examined the
context into which each of the pricing agreements was en-
tered.5 ' The court concluded that any indication of disparate
pricing was justified because certain distributors threatened to
decrease Bayferrox purchases and buy from an alternative sup-
plier if Bayer did not provide lower prices."' Similarly, Bayer
was aware that the distributors making the threats were capa-
151. See id. at *3. Bayer moved for summary judgment on three other grounds in
addition to that of meeting competition. Bayer contended that Hoover had not dem-
onstrated competitive injury under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act, that
Hoover had not shown injury in fact under section 4 of the Clayton Act, and that the
prices at which Bayferrox was sold to other national distributors were "functionally
available" to Hoover. Because the court granted Bayer's motion on meeting compe-
tition grounds, it did not decide any of these other issues. See id. at *12 n.7.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1994).
153. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
154. Hoover Color, 1998 WL 690991 at *4 (citing Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-
Corning Fiberglass Corp., 971 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Gypsum, 438 U.S. at
455)).
155. Id.
156. See il. at *6-12.
157. See id. at *9-10.
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ble of substituting synthetic iron oxides for Bayferrox and that
such iron oxides were being imported into the country in great-
er volumes." Judge Kiser verified the availability of such al-
ternatives and found that Bayer had reason to believe that
these threats were real.'59 Furthermore, the court reasoned
that, given Bayer's need to maximize production at its West
Virginia manufacturing facility, it was necessary for Bayer to
meet the competitive prices offered to its other distributors."w
Judge Kiser concluded by stating:
[b]ased on these uncontested facts, I have no trouble con-
cluding that, as a matter of law, Bayer's proposed discount
pricing schedule was made in a good faith attempt to meet
competition .... Bayer has shown the "existence of facts
that would lead a reasonable and prudent person to believe
that [Bayers] lower price would meet the equally low price
of a competitor." Indeed, that is the only reasonable con-
clusion which the evidence supports.16'
Judge Kiser noted that Bayer's meeting competition evidence
was uncontested by Hoover.16 In addition, the court held that
Hoover failed to present any material evidence to counter the
conclusion that Bayer offered lower prices to its other national
distributors due to a good faith competitive necessity to meet
competition for their business." As a result, the court had
little difficulty granting Bayer's summary judgment motion on
the meeting competition defense."'
Similarly, in Soth v. Baltimore Sunpapers, Inc.," the
Fourth Circuit had little difficulty affirming the dismissal of
another suit charging a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act.
Edward Soth, Jr. filed two suits in the Circuit Court for Balti-
more City against his former employer, Baltimore Sunpapers,
158. See id. at *6.
159. See id.
160. See id. at *7.
161. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460
U.S. 428, 451 (1983)).
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id. at *8.
165. Nos. 96-2385 & 96-2390, 1998 WL 225140, at *1 (4th Cir. May 4, 1998) (un-
published table decision).
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Inc. ("Sunpapers"), alleging identical state law claims of abusive
discharge, violations of the Maryland Antitrust Act, tortious
interference with contract, and civil conspiracy. Soth essentially
claimed that he was terminated for not going along with an
alleged episode of price discrimination by his employer."
After the newspaper removed the claims to federal court,
Soth withdrew the lone federal claim he had filed against his
former employer in an attempt to- have the action
remanded. 7 The district court denied Soth's motion to re-
mand and granted summary judgement in favor of the defen-
dants on all of Soth's claims." In reviewing the findings of
the district court, the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding no viola-
tion of the antitrust laws.6 9
Employed as an automotive advertising sales manager, Soth's
primary responsibility was selling advertising space in the
defendant's newspapers to automobile dealerships located with-
in a specified geographical area. His employment was governed
by a collective bargaining agreement which prohibited employ-
ees from exploiting their position with the newspaper for per-
sonal gain.7 On July 30, 1990, Sunpapers discovered that
Soth was using his employment position to facilitate the adver-
tisement of three automobile dealerships in newspapers other
than those operated by Sunpapers. In exchange for his services,
the dealerships gave Soth a 1987 GMC truck and approximate-
ly $24,000 a year.'
Sunpapers placed Soth on a five-day, unpaid suspension.
During this period, Sunpapers learned that Soth had placed
advertisements for two of his "personal clients," and on August
3, 1990, Sunpapers discharged Soth for "gross insubordination
for violating the terms of his suspension."72 Soth unsuccess-
fully challenged the discharge by filing complaints with the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, the Equal Employment Opportu-
nities Commission, and the American Arbitration Associa-
166. See id. at *1.
167. See id.
168. See id at *2.
169. See id. at *3.
170. See id. at *2.
171. See id.
172. Id.
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tion.7 3 Soth then filed a complaint in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Maryland, which subsequently dis-
missed the claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) and 4(j). 74 In the wake of the district court's dismiss-
al, Soth filed identical claims in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City.
75
In both suits, Soth asserted that the impetus behind his
dismissal was an episode in which he openly disagreed with his
superiors regarding a discounted advertising rate that
Sunpapers provided one dealership and not other regularly
paying customers. 71 Soth maintained that he confronted his
superiors, informing them that the advertising discount was
price discrimination and was a violation of Maryland's Antitrust
Act. 77 Soth claimed that he was fired because he threatened
to reveal this discriminatory practice to the publisher of the
newspaper, as well as to the Federal Trade Commission. 178
Upon reviewing the record, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court, which held that Soth had adduced
no evidence of competitive injury in support of his price dis-
crimination claim.'79 Further, the circuit court noted that Soth
utterly failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether a "monopoly power existed and was maintained in the
relevant market through the Sunpapers' half-price discounting
of one advertisement on one day."80 The Fourth Circuit also
agreed with the district court's finding that Soth's conspiracy
claim failed because he was unable to prove that Sunpapers
had agreed to commit an unlawful act.18" '
173. See id.
174. See id. at *3.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id. Section 2(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman
Act, contains a competitive injury requirement. See 15 U.S.C. § 13 (aX1994). In order
to prove a section 2(a) violation, a plaintiff must establish that the defendant sold to
two buyers at different prices and that such discrimination may substantially injure
competition. See id.
180. Soth, 1998 WL 225140, at *3.
181. See id. (citing Yousef v. Trustbank Say., 568 A.2d 1134, 1139 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1990)).
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E. Monopolization
Caught in the cross-fire between patent and antitrust laws,
Semiconductor Energy Laboratory ("SEL") and Samsung Semi-
conductor, Inc. ("Samsung") squared off in the Eastern District
of Virginia in Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung
Electronics Co.' Samsung brought its antitrust counterclaims
asserted in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machine &
Chemical Corp.' to SEL's patent infringement suit. Samsung
contended that SEL was "attempting to unlawfully monopolize
particular markets by initiating litigation over patents SEL
knows are invalid or unenforceable."' Judge Cacheris dis-
missed Samsung's antitrust counterclaims asserted under the
Sherman Act, as well as the New Jersey"s and California'
antitrust statutes.'
The district court first addressed Samsung's counterclaim in
Walker Process Equipment."s Walker Process Equipment estab-
lished that a patentee who initiates an infringement suit may
be subject to antitrust liability for anticompetitive effects
caused by the suit if the alleged infringer can establish that the
asserted patent was procured through knowing and willful
fraud. 9 The district court noted that most of Samsung's con-
tentions involved failures to disclose information to the Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO"), which are not encompassed
within a Walker Process Equipment claim. 9
The court also rejected claims asserted by Samsung based on
allegations of knowing, willful and affirmative misrepresenta-
tions to the PTO, finding that Samsung was unable to prove
the specific intent to monopolize and the predatory acts in fur-
therance thereof, which are required to maintain a Sherman
182. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 72,166 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 1998).
183. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
184. Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. at 82,069.
185. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:9-1 to -18 (West 1989 & Supp. 1998).
186. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16600-17365 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
187. See Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. at 82,073.
188. See id. at 82,070 (citing Walker Process Equip., 382 U.S. at 177).
189. See Walker Process Equip., 382 U.S. at 177.
190. See Semiconductor Energy Lab., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. at 82,070.
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Act attempted monopolization claim. 9' An attempted monopo-
lization claim under the Sherman Act has the following three
elements: (i) a specific intent to monopolize the relevant mar-
ket; (ii) predatory or anticompetitive actions in furtherance of
such an intent; and (iii) a dangerous probability of success.'9 '
Samsung charged attempted monopolization in connection
with three alleged relevant product markets: (i) products using
amorphous silicon with low impurity levels; (ii) technology for
production of the same; and (iii) innovation Involving the same.
The court employed the 1995 joint guidelines for licensing of
intellectual property to further define the latter two relevant
product markets.' The guidelines define a technology market
as "the intellectual property that is licensed ... and its close
substitutes.""9 An innovation market is defined as "the re-
search and development directed to particular new or improved
goods or processes, and the close substitutes for that research
and development." 9'
The court first noted that because SEL licensed its patent to
at least two other manufacturers and continued to seek other
licensing agreements, no reasonable trier of fact could find that
SEL employed methods, means, and practices that would ac-
complish monopolization or create a dangerous probability of
it. " The court held as well that "[a]ttempting to enforce an
unenforceable patent, without more, also does not support a
finding of a method, means, or practice which creates a danger-
ous probability of monopolization."'97
As to the alleged technology market, the district court con-
cluded that SEL's licensing efforts were not indicative of a
specific intent to monopolize and noted that although specific
intent may be inferred from anticompetitive acts, 9' "SEL's
191. See id. at 82,071.
192. See id. (discussing the standard applied in M & M Medical Supplies and
Services Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hospital, Inc., 981 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 1992) (en
banc)).
193. See ANTrrRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
reprinted in ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, app. E
1483 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter GUIDELINES].
194. Id. at § 3.2.2.
195. Id.
196. See Semiconductor Energy Lab., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. at 82,071.
197. Id.
198. See M & M Med. Supplies & Serv., Inc. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp. Inc., 981
1000
ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION LAW
granting licenses to at least two companies in the market de-
feats the inference."' The court also found that Samsung of-
fered no evidence of a licensing scheme that would give SEL
monopoly power in the broad technology market.0
The court likewise found that Samsung did not prove that
SEL possessed a dangerous probability of successfully monopo-
lizing the innovation market by virtue of its efforts to enforce
its patent."' Moreover, the court found that SEL did not have
a share of the product market and, thus, could not be found to
possess the requisite probability of monopolizing any mar-
ket.20
2
Furthermore, the court noted that Samsung's claim of injury,
consisting of expenses incurred in defending itself and in de-
signing substitutes for the patented products, were not compen-
sable under the antitrust laws. 203 The court stated that those
laws were designed to protect competition, not individual com-petitors.2°
Samsung's second basis for liability focused upon the rule
articulated in Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovation, Inc.
2 15
Samsung asserted that the infringement suit initiated by SEL
was a "sham" aimed at covering up efforts to interfere with the
business dealings of a market competitor.0 6 Upon examining
the record, the court found that SEL provided reasonable de-
fenses to the counterclaim asserted by Samsung.2 ' The court
noted that in light of the explanations that SEL offered for its
conduct before the PTO, a jury could not reasonably find that
the patent infringement suit initiated by SEL was objectively
baseless.0" Finally, the court dismissed antitrust claims under
F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
199. Semiconductor Energy Lab., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. at 82,071.
200. See id.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. See id. at 82,072.
204. See id. (citing Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 931 (4th Cir.
1990)).
205. 129 F.3d 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
206. See Semiconductor Energy Lab., 7 Trade Reg. Rep. at 82,070 (quoting
Nobelpharma, 129 F.3d at 1470).
207. See id. at 82,072.
208. See id.
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California's Cartwright Act and New Jersey's Antitrust Law,
concluding that Samsung had not properly plead a Cartwright
Act violation and that the rationale for dismissing the Sherman
Act claim applied to both state statutes.'09
IV. SIGNIFICANT FRANCHISING LITIGATION CONTINUES
Most recently, on August 19, 1998, the Fourth Circuit decided
Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc."1° The pro-
tracted and complex franchising battle between franchisees and
the franchisor of the Meineke Discount Muffler Shops resulted
in a $390 million judgment against Meineke in the Western
District of North Carolina for breach of contract, breach of
fiduciary duty, negligence and unjust enrichment."' The suit
originated from complaints by ten franchisees against franchisor
Meineke, Meineke's in-house advertising agency, officers of
Meineke and two of Meineke's corporate parents. The plaintiffs
claimed that Meineke mishandled franchise advertising in con-
travention of the franchise contract and that they purported to
represent a nationwide class of current and former Meineke
dealers. On appeal, Meineke contended that the district court
improperly certified the class, in violation of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(a). The Fourth Circuit agreed, reversing and
remanding the case for further action at the district level."
Addressing the class deficiencies seriatim, the court noted
that "[t]he first obstacle to class treatment of this suit is the
conflict of interest between different groups of franchisees with
respect to the appropriate relief," which the United States Su-
preme Court clearly has held precludes certification. 3 The
court noted that those plaintiffs who were former franchise
owners only had an interest in maximizing the damages
Meineke would have to pay, whereas the different groups of
present franchise owners had a vested interest in the ongoing
health of their franchises.214 The present franchise owners al-
209. See id. at 82,072-73.
210. Nos. 97-1808 & 97-1848, 1998 WL 512926, at *1 (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1998).
211. See id at *1.
212. See id.
213. Id. at *5.
214. See id
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so could be harmed financially and by poor future relations
with Meineke.215 The court noted that this conflict was mani-
fest in the initial tension between those members of the "non-
opt-out" plaintiff class who wished to put the dispute behind
them and those who wished to pursue maximum financial
relief.216 In addition, members of the class who, by virtue of
having signed releases as part of their agreements with
Meineke, were precluded from pursuing anything other than
restitutionary relief were prejudiced by plaintiffs' express waiv-
er of any restitutionary claim. 17
In addition to the above conflicts, the Fourth Circuit also
noted the failings of the class to meet the commonality and
typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)(2) and (3) as a barrier to
certification. 218 For example, the Meineke franchise agree-
ments varied significantly from year to year and from franchise
to franchise, thereby eliminating a single collective breach of
contract claim.219 Furthermore, plaintiffs' claims of breach of
fiduciary duty, fraud and negligent misrepresentation were
predicated on individualized representations to each franchisee,
as offered by plaintiffs through audiotapes of final review ses-
sions between the putative franchisees and Meineke. These
claims also were predicated on individualized determinations of
reliance by the franchisees" and on statute of limitations
analyses.' Finally, the court examined the peculiarly individ-
.ualized analysis required to determine lost profits alleged by
each member of the class as an unavoidable barrier to certifica-
tion.'
Based upon these factors, the Fourth Circuit easily concluded
that the class the district court certified was "no more than a
'hodgepodge of factually as well as legally different plaintiffs,'
thereby warranting reversal of the certification ruling of the
district court.' The court thereafter concluded that reversal
215. See id.
216. See id. at *6.
217. See id. at *7.
218. See id.
219. See id. at *8.
220. See id. at *9.
221. See id. at *10.
222. See id. at *11.
223. See id. at *12.
224. Id. at *13 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d
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of the judgment below also was warranted because the certifica-
tion issue and ruling necessarily impacted every stage of the
trial proceeding, thereby allowing plaintiffs to present a "'per-
fect plaintiff pieced together for litigation."2" With instruc-
tions to dismiss plaintiffs' claims against two of Meineke's cor-
porate parents, the court remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings at the district level.2"
V. FEDERAL REGULATORY, ADMINISTRATIVE AND
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
A. Criminal Enforcement Efforts
Bringing closure to two individual prosecutions from a two-
year investigation performed by the Department of Justice
Antitrust Division that resulted in the convictions of twelve
individuals and a corporation, the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Romer, 7 affirmed the convictions of two real estate
speculators for bid-rigging activities associated with real estate
foreclosure auctions. Mija Romer and Khem Batra were tried
and convicted by a jury for violating section 1 of the Sherman
Act by rigging bids at various real estate foreclosure auctions in
Fairfax, Virginia.'
Romer and Batra were real estatd speculators who conspired
with others to depress prices of auctioned properties by agree-
ing not to enter bids in opposition to one another at specified
auctions, which allowed the properties to be purchased at artifi-
cially low, non-competitive prices. Following the rigged public
auctions, private auctions would be held among the conspirators
during which each would bid competitively for the properties,
with the high bidder taking the property. The money saved by
insulating the group's bids from other competition was their
Cir. 1996), affd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997)).
225. Id. at *13-14.
226. See id. at *20-25 (finding no basis for piercing the corporate veil or for im-
posing direct liability on the parents).
227. 148 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 1998).
228. See id at 363.
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illicit profit, which would be paid out to all of the members of
-the group.m
Following their convictions, both individuals unsuccessfully
appealed the district court's denial of a judgment of acquittal,
contending that "the Government failed to demonstrate that the
conspiracy's bid rigging activities involved 'commerce among the
several states,' as required by § 1. " " The Fourth Circuit con-
cluded otherwise."
Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads, "[elvery contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States ... is
hereby declared to be illegal." 2 The Fourth Circuit main-
tained that "the Sherman Act is conspicuous for its breadth,"
noting that Congress intended the Act to reach the constitution-
al limits of the commerce power." Relying upon the standard
espoused by the Supreme Court in McLain v. Real Estate Board
of New Orleans, Inc.,' the court held that, in order to meet
its burden, the Government must, "demonstrate by submission
of evidence beyond the pleadings either (1) that the defendants'
activity is itself in interstate commerce or, (2) if it is local in
nature, that it has an effect on some other appreciable activity
demonstrably in interstate commerce." 5 The court noted that
the second prong of this standard allows for a finding that "a
defendant's conduct, although 'wholly local in nature,' falls
within the ambit of the Sherman Act when, 'as a matter of
practical economics,' the activities 'have a not insubstantial
effect on the interstate commerce involved."' 6
Defendants argued that a sufficient nexus did not exist be-
tween their bid-rigging activities and interstate commerce, giv-
en the fact that all of the auctions took place within Virginia,
that all real estate was located in Virginia, and. that all par-
229. See id.
230. Id. at 364.
231. See id. at 365.
232. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
233. Romer, 148 F.3d at 364.
234. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
235. Romer, 148 F.3d at 365 (quoting McLain, 444 U.S. at 242).
236. Id (quoting McClain, 444 U.S. at 241, 246 (citations omitted)).
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ticipants were Virginia residents. 37 The court rejected this
"purely local" argument, stating:
Determining whether anti-competitive activities are within
the reach of the Sherman Act is a practical inquiry, one
which requires us to consider the substance of the transac-
tion at issue. In conducting [the Sherman Act] inquiry, we
look beneath the surface of the transaction, with an eye
toward assessing its interstate features. We consider not
only the location of the transaction and the immediate par-
ties, but all other conceivable links with interstate com-
merce, including the interests of secondary parties and the
passage across state lines of goods and services related to
the transaction.'
The court connected defendants' conspiracy to interstate com-
merce because each auction was initiated by an out-of-state
lender who directed the terms of the auctions and received
across state lines some portion of their interest in the various
foreclosed properties. 9
Defendants, relying on United States v. Lopez, also chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the Sherman Act, asserting that
the "Act exceeds Congress' power to regulate pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, because it grants federal jurisdiction over
local activity with only a de minimis ... connection to inter-
state commerce.""4 The court rejected this argument, finding
that Lopez requires the statute in question to contain a jurisdic-
tional element which allows for a thorough case-by-case analy-
sis of whether or not the activity in question affects interstate
commerce. 2 Having made such an analysis, the Fourth Cir-
cuit upheld the lower court's denial of judgment for acquit-
tal.243
237. See id.
238. Id. i
239. See id. at 365-66.
240. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
241. Romer, 148 F.3d at 366.
242. See id.
243. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
While the century old antitrust statutes are broadly worded,
over the years the courts have added a substantial gloss which
subjects antitrust plaintiffs to rigorous requirements of proof,
both legal and economic. While the treble damage stakes are
high, these cases are difficult to plead and prove, as evidenced
by the uniform resolution of those cases decided over the past
year.
Recognizing the burden and expense of antitrust litigation,
courts are scrutinizing cases to determine whether sufficient
allegations of an actionable conspiracy exist, whether antitrust
injury is present, and whether the claim simply makes econom-
ic sense. The absence of proof concerning these and other fac-
tors has resulted in these cases seldom coming before a jury,
much less resulting in the successful prosecution of any civil
antitrust case. Indeed, the recent history, as set forth in this
article, indicates that only when the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice gets involved has there
been any judgment for an antitrust plaintiff.
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